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TH I' PSYCHOTHERAPIST AS MORALIST 
Daniel C. Maguire, S.T.D. 
" The analyst rapects his patient's per-
sonality; he does not try to mo uld it ac-
cording to his own personal ideas; he is 
satisfied when instead of gi ving advice he 
can obtain his results by arousing the 
patient's own initiative." (Sigmund Freud) 
T he death of consensus is a fact 
of the contemporary human con-
dition. The field of psychotherapy 
exemplifies this. Nevertheless, if 
we set aside those therapists who 
have succumbed to the simplistic 
allurements of a Skinnerian type 
behaviorism, we can expect that 
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the opening citation from Freud 
will probably win very general ac-
ceptance. No good psychotherapist 
should go about imposing his own 
personal ideas, especially his own 
moral ideas, on his patients. And 
the patients should feel confident 
that the therapist will not be in-
sinuating his personal moral ex-
pectations in the name of therapy. 
This would be all well and good 
if it were not impossible. Wha~­
ever his conscious intentions, every 
therapist, to some degree and quite 
unavoidably, communicates and 
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Imposes his own moral and even 
religious valuations on his pa-
tients. It is the contention of this 
article that this is so, and that there-
fore it would be well for the 
therapist to recognize his actual 
role as ethicist and moral counselor 
and learn to perform it less badly 
or even well. He may, and, indeed 
should, revere the ideal contained 
in the above quotation from Freud, 
but he must acknowledge the reality 
of the influentia l value-communica-
tion that transpires in multi pie 
and subtle ways between him and 
his patient. 
F irst of all, then, let us elucidate 
what morality is so that we, 
praiseworthily, might know what 
we are talking about. Secondly, it 
will be argued that the therapist 
is inescapably involved in the 
moral condition of his patient. 
And finally, some conclusions 
will be offered to assist with the 
moral aspect of counselling. 
The Meaning of Morality 
One reason why therapists may 
feel that they can prescind from 
moral questions is that they are 
unclear about the meaning of the 
term moral. This is entirely under-
standable, albeit regrettable. It 
is part of the human problem that 
the terms we most use are the 
terms we most abuse. False mean-
ings and connotations easily at-
tach to words as they pass through 
the vagaries of human discourse. 
The term " mora l" is widely used 
and abused. In common parlance 
and in technical scientific, social, 
and philosophic literature, the 
term appears with no consistent 
meaning. 
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To some people, mc•ral means 
compromising, absoHJte prin-
l ·!es. To others it rela• s to one's 
r I .~ious teachings. It · also used 
to , ignify the ideal as )posed to 
the hard, practical re ies. And 
in a way that is relevant psychol-
ogy and psychotherap_ l1e term 
moral suffered grievo• in the 
school of thought kn as Pos-
iti vism. Positivism wa~ t one of 
those philosophies .se ideas 
passed harmlessly t, m journal 
to tome with little i ;.1pact on the 
concrete world of the li ving. Pos-
itivism was not just a school but a 
climate-setter. In its climate, many 
critical categories of Western 
thought took shape. 
It was Positivism, for example, 
that encouraged the idea that 
objectivity was linked to being 
va lue-free. This idea spread with 
epidemic force through even those 
sciences that should have been 
concerned with the discovery and 
elucidation of operative value as-
sumptions and judgments. Instead, 
the chimeric ideal of "value-free-
ness" hung over important develop-
mental periods of such disciplines 
as sociology, education, political 
science, and psychology. Psycho-
therapy did not escape the in-
fectious assumption that good, 
scientific practice necessitates a 
clean break from the realm of 
moral evaluation. Since they grew 
up in these shadows, it is •:asy to 
understand the uneasiness an~ cagi-
ness of the therapist when they 
discuss the morality question vis·· 
a-vis their practice. In the name 
of objectivity and good science, 
morality is treated as though it 
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were not there. But it is there a ' 
it is intr i'ls ic of personal exister 
and well •eing. 
So wha oes moral n•ean? Bri ·y, 
moral m s human . . . in .he 
normati v sense of that term. 
Human be used descriptive ly, 
or norr vely. For example, it 
is hum ~o be selfish. T his is 
descripti people are often that 
way. Nc tively, however, it is 
not humc. o be selfish. People 
should not that way. The study 
of morality, then, is the study of 
what people should and should 
not be if they would be truly human. 
The moral question arises be-
cause, as Nietzsche says, man is a 
va luing animal. However con-
trolled he may be by nner and 
outer determinisms, he is not en-
tirely programmed. Rather, his 
agony and his dignity is found in 
his capacity to select among the 
many values that compete for his 
attention and selection. Of course, 
not all values a re moral values. 
For example, there is value in be-
ing able to do mathematics, or 
in being able to dance o r play 
music. But these values are not 
moral values because you can lack 
them without being less human. 
A clumsy person ·might be truly 
human, as might a student who 
fails in mathematics. However 
sad it is to lack beauty or agility 
or particular intellectual skills, it 
is not of itself dehumanizing. We 
can have some of the values, and 
not others and still be thoroughly 
human and moral. 
It is an entirely different story, 
however, if someone claims to be 
good at justice but poor at veraci ty. 
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It is more than somewhat regret-
table if a person is splendidly 
courageous but distinctly prone 
to murder. Moral values pertain to 
a realm of value that is constitutive 
of human personhood . They are 
not optional. Moral values ar e es-
sential to and constitutive of our 
humanness and of our personhood. 
When moral values are at issue, 
our humanity is at issue. The mora l 
question is utterly serious. 
When a moral value is rej ected 
with some degree of freedom the 
pa in of guilt is experienced. Guilt 
is a ripping and tearing expe-
rience in which the guilty agent 
knows that what he does is in 
radical confrontation with what 
he is. Action and being are at odds. 
What one does contradicts and re-
jects what one is . Human behavior 
should enhance the process of 
humanization . Guilty behavior 
thwarts that process. 
An example might alleviate the 
abstractness of this description. 
Some primitive peoples studi ed 
by anthropologists punish incest 
by making the incestuous pa ir eat 
from the trough of hogs. The ex-
a mple, however offensive to our 
delicacies, is a remarkable sym-
bolization of what we mean by 
guilt. The offending couple is 
seen as having acted in a beastly 
and inhuman way. By way of ret-
ribution and to dramatize their 
gui lt, they are made to eat in a 
beastly and inhuman way. In 
various ways, the liturgies of guilt 
that are part of every culture at-
tempt to demonstrate this same 
point, that the penitent has acted 
in a way that is incompatible with 
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what he is. 
Guilt, of course, can be either 
healthy or neurot ic. (Therapists 
who are only aware of sick guilt, 
take heed!) Just as a malfunction-
ing censoring or warning device 
might sound an alarm when no 
cause is present. J disturbed per-
son may expel"ience guilt for 
activity which is only imagined or 
which is mistakenly fe lt to be im-
mora l. The goal of therapy in such 
cases is obvious, however dif-
ficult it may be to achieve. 
On the other hand, gui lt can be 
a normal, healthy reaction to clear-
ly immoral activity. Therapy here, 
of course, does not consist in dis-
guising this normal reaction or by 
branding it a neurosis. 
Part of the Freudian legacy to 
psychotherapy (to which even 
non-Freudian therapists are per-
haps unwitting heirs) is the 
tendency to see normal and ab-
normal as existing on a qualitatively 
undifferentiated continuum. Ther-
apists should examine their pro fes-
sional consciences on this, partic-
ularly with regard to the guilt ques-
tion. It is good therapy as well as 
good logic to make distinctions 
where there are differences. And 
real guilt is not identical with 
neurotic guilt. 
It should, of course, be noted 
and granted that healthy gui lt with 
which a person does not know how 
to cope, can become neurotic izing. 
But it could be no less neuroticiz-
ing to cater to the illusion that a ll 
guilt is sick or unreal. (How a 
therapist could purport to deal with 
a guilt problem of any kind with-
out entering the field of ethics is 
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s1 tething we will retur 
n 1tarily.) 
lora! va lues, then, ar 
tin ive ly human value 
rna_ vary immensely in 
ing \vhat is moral and '' 
moral but they do not v~: 
sidering the moral quest 
one of utmost gravity. 
havioral contradiction 
values induces the bas 
to mo 
the dis-
People 
' etermin-
.t is im-
in con-
t to be 
he be-
moral 
human 
phenomenon of guilt. 1 uilt is a 
painful and, indeed, .ntolerable 
experience. We withdraw from it 
as we do from a hot object ac-
c identally touched, immediately 
and instinctively. The withdrawal 
from guilt is achieved either by be-
havorial reorientation or by ra-
tionalization and self-deception. 
But withdraw we must. No one 
can think of himself comfortably 
as evil. 
As a result, every man is a moral-
ist, or, if you will, an ethicist. 
(The two terms are, for all prac-
tica l purposes, synonymous.) The 
task of ethics is to determine true 
human values and to discern wh ich 
a ttitudes, actions, and omiSSions 
are moral or immoral. Scientific 
ethics goes about this task sys-
tematically by developing a me-
thodology that is as thorough and 
as sensitive as possible. The ulti-
mate goal of ethics is to determine 
what humanness means. And since 
we are not automatically good or 
bad, the challenge of ethics ;s ad-
dressed to every man and i. this 
sense every man is an ethiciSt. 
People get their ethical answers 
in various ways. Authority figures 
are a prime source . . . parents, 
churches, peers. Persons who are 
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more secure and reflective mi ·,t 
reach et hical conclusio ns n. ;e 
independently, through persf 1al 
discover~ experience, a nd anal-
ysis. Re ,ious persons might seek 
moral 1ightenment from mys-
tical c• nunion with God. But 
for thL nost part, people take 
moral · · ruction from the group 
and thr uthority figu res thereof. 
How P' 'lotherapy relates to all 
of this i· matter that can now be 
discussed. 
Morality and Psychotherapy 
Carl R. Rogers, in his Client-
Centered Therapy writes: 
''As we listen to recordings of ther-
apeutic interviews, and study the trans-
scribed material, it is very evident in-
deed that therapy has much to do with 
what is perceived as 'good' or 'bad,' 
' right' or 'wrong,' 'satisfying' or 'un-
sat isfying.' It somehow involves the 
value system of the individual, and 
changes in tha t system. This is an aspect 
of therapy which has been little dis-
cussed, and thus far barely touched 
from a research point of view." 
It is at least remarkable that some-
thing as basic and as important 
to a patient as his value structure 
could be " thus far barely touched 
from a research point of view." 
And yet, who would dispute Rogers' 
observation on this point? If this 
phenomenon were to be researched, 
one thing that would command at-
tention would be the role of the 
therapist in affecting evaluational 
change. Only a therapist who is 
beguiled by his own non-directive 
rhetoric would believe that he has 
had absolutely no directive input 
in this development. 
Part of the difficulty here is that 
psychiatry which has been so at-
tentive to the subjective experience 
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of subverbal and subconscious 
experiences has had too little to 
say about the subverbal, subliminal, 
and subconscious communication 
of these experiences. And yet there 
is a growing appreciation abroad 
today, which is being fed by a 
variety of disciplines, that any con-
versation is filled with communica-
tory symbols only some few of 
which are words. This would seem 
to be especially true in the deep 
intimacy of psychotherapeutic 
conversation. 
We can pursue this point by view-
ing firs t of all the nature of the 
client-therapist re lationship, the 
authority status of the therapist in 
our culture, and the peculiar in-
securities generated by the valua-
tional upheavals of contemporary 
society. 
Psychologist Joseph Nuttin was 
expressing what should be obvious 
when he wrote in his Psychoanal-
ysis and Personality that: 
" ... the therapist's t reatment is not si m-
ply the appl ication of a technique; it 
establishes between the therapist and 
the pa tient a personal relatio nship which 
plays an essential part in the actua l pro-
cess of treatment, and for this reason 
the whole personality of the therapist, 
with his life-conception and his whole 
way of looking at things, exerts an un-
avoidable influence on it." 
Nuttin elaborates on this by not-
ing, "the discovery, in many d if-
ferent countries, that in a great 
number of cases of loss of psychic 
balance, the heart of the trouble 
has been found to be bound up with 
the problem of the meaning and 
content of life." It should be ob-
vious that this concern is also a 
moral concern . It should be ob-
vious too that the patient, given 
Linacre Q uarterly 
tensions th.:tt brought him into 
therapy, will have his antennae 
highly sensitized to a ll signals re-
lated to this accute personal and 
moral need. 
To speak of the meaning of life, 
of course, is to speak of something 
that cannot enti re ly be verbalized. 
In such an experience of meaning, 
there is much of the ineffable the 
felt, the imagined, and the h~ped 
for. Abraham Maslow speaks of 
the communication of the ineffable: 
" . . . Poetic and metamorphical language, 
physiognomic and synesthetic language, 
p rimary process language of the kind 
found in dreams, reveries, free associa-
tions a nd fantasies, not to mention pre-
words and non-words such as gestures, 
tone of voice, style of speaking, body 
tonus, facial express ions - all these are 
more efficacious in communicating 
certain aspects of the ineffable." 
How could a therapist silence all 
the signals of meta-communication 
and implicit conversation? How 
could he turn off his "pre-words 
and non-words?" It seems likely 
that he could not do so. It seems 
that something like "transference" 
(without insisting on a Freudian 
definition of that term) always takes 
place in therapy. At least, it would 
be difficult to find a therapist who 
would deny that a deep, close, 
multi-level relationsh ip develops 
in any extended therapy. Such a 
relationshi p could not be had with-
out a good deal of communication 
on matters of basic concern. Other-
wise the requisite trust could not 
be generated! 
Also relevant to the communica-
tion between patient a nd therapist 
is the authority status of doctors 
in our society. A doctor today is, 
as he was in many primitive so-
August, 1972 
·' ties, something of a rriest. Peo-
; naturally attribute " ~<;redness" 
whate\ L r touches t~· ultimates 
h as life and death hese mat-
of ultimate concet re within 
tl', province of docto1 f he signs 
of their sacred statu~ ~ many. 
Doctors seem natu ral , evoke 
the confidence and t that is 
traditionally reserved "holy 
men." They have ar 1sist on 
titles. Special vestm• are as-
sociated with the por image of 
a doctor. And polic en give to 
doctors the traffic enforcement 
courtesies customarily reserved for 
the clergy. These men who preside 
a t the sacred events of birth and 
death are not without a sacerdotal 
aura. 
If this is so, the doctor, and par-
ticularly the therapist, should know 
that people attribute to him author-
ity that is not limited to the tech-
nicalities of medicine. By culture 
they are atuned to expect of him 
priestly tasks, not the least of which 
is moral instruction. Priests are 
figures of d irection, not of non-
d irection. The doctor may as well 
know that divestiture from priestly 
status is not easily achieved. 
A final factor relevant to client-
therapist communication is the 
revolution in values that is taking 
place today. Values previously en-
shrined in consensus are now chal-
lenged even by the very authority 
figures who used to uphold them. 
Persons who would retain older 
standards of morality often find 
themselves what sociologists call 
"a cognitive minority". Given the 
human need for social support in 
knowing as in living, cognitive 
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minorities are usually shrill a 
nervous. 
This p oblem can take anot ·r 
form as : does with persons \' •o, 
caught ir <he maelstrom, are <.-m -
stantly s· cing their moral stances. 
Years a: one would have to look 
back sc .-a! generations at least 
to find substantially different 
view of tat makes for the good 
life. To many persons find 
themselve :n serious disagreement 
with their , -.vn moral views of just 
a few years ago. This can be highly 
unsettling. Many patients in therapy 
today have been shaken by one of 
these experiences. It can increase 
their need for moral guidance and 
moral dependency. 
In summary, it would be well 
for the therapist to remember that, 
whatever the psychiatric specifica-
tions of a particular case, the pa-
tient is a moral being seeking like 
all of us a fuller appreciation of 
his human and moral meaning. 
Given the nature of human relat-
ing, the therapist is speaking in 
subtle but influential ways to the 
moral questions of the patient. 
Therapy does not take place in a 
moral vacuum. Both he and the pa-
tient should know this. 
Conclusions 
I. The therapist should recognize 
that non-directive counselling 
(this concept is variously nuanced 
and described in the different 
schools) is still an ideal. T he goal 
must still be, in Freud's words, to 
"obta in . . . results by arousing 
the patient's own initiative." A 
certain mature autonomy in valuing 
is the mark of a hea lthy personality. 
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Non-directive counselling at its 
best is less directive counselling. 
But without the ideal of non-direc-
tiveness, the moral influence of 
the therapist would be even more 
imposing. 
2. Since the therapist is to some 
degree a confessor, he should kno w 
what the years have taught Cath-
olic confessors. One mark of the 
good confessor is flex ibility. A con-
fessor is taught that he may not, 
implicitly or explicitly, impose 
his own more rigorous view on an 
issue where expert moralists are 
at odds. The confessor may feel 
that " the opinion favoring freedom" 
is disastrously wrong, but he may 
not impose his more rigorous 
stance if respected moralists find 
solid reasons for freedom. Ubi 
dubium, ibi libertas (Where there 
is doubt, there is freedom) was 
the wisdom behind this position. 
The practice of the Catholic Church 
a lso reflects this wisdom. The 
C hurch has not attempted to com-
mit herself infallibly on any par-
ticular issue of morality. The rea-
son for this is that moral judgments 
of particular issues must be based 
not only on a relevant wisdom of 
revelation and traditional prin-
ciples, but also on the mora l mean-
ing of the concrete circumstances 
of every case. It would take divine 
foreknm.~ledge to assess in advance 
the moral meaning of every human 
situat io n. No one less than God 
could attempt to do this, nor has 
the Church attempted to do it. 
(Quite typically and consistently, 
Humanae Vitae was published with 
an admission of its fallibility.) 
There are many seriously dis-
puted issues of morality today 
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where powerful reasons and ex-
pert authority is found o n both 
sides of the dispute. A therapist 
with illusions of infallibility on 
these issues is just what a patient 
does not need. ("Notes in Moral 
Theology," by Richard Me Cor-
mick, S.J . and Robert Springer, 
S.J. appears semi-annually in 
Theological Studies. If a ther-
apist wants to know where ethics 
is today, he could begin with these 
Notes.) 
3. The psychotherapist has a lot 
to teach the professional ethicist. 
A good deal of ethics involves 
moral principles. Few if any of 
these principles are self-evident. 
They are rather a distillation of 
what much empirical evidence 
has shown to be truly human and 
truly moral. Further evidence can 
confirm, amend, or even disprove 
moral principles. The his tory of 
ethics witnesses this. Therapists 
have some of that evidence. Carl 
Rogers says: "My views regarding 
the meaning of the good life a re 
largely based upon my experience 
in working with people in the very 
close and intimate relationship 
which is called psychotherapy." 
Things about human life will be 
learned in therapy that will not be 
learned in a library. The profes-
sional ethicist should hear those 
things. And the therapist should 
learn to respect his own experience 
of what is good even when tha t 
experience clashes with what mor-
a lists have taught him in the past. 
The therapist should be in con-
stant conversation with the mora l-
ist and he should know that he does 
not come to that conversation 
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npty-han~ed . 
4. Since moral value c •mmuni~..a­
m unavoidably trans,•'res in a 
vchotherapeutic conte· , a furth.!r 
c:, • elusion · suggests self. At 
times a therapist may ve to dis-
qua lify himself from t. treatment 
of a certain patient. If patient's 
moral and religious valu re totally 
opposed to that of tl therapist 
to the point where t' therapist 
sees them as nearly ~urd, the 
therapy will probab generate 
more problems tha1 it solves. 
Ideally any therapist could treat 
any patient. Unfortunately, the 
ideal is not always identica l with 
the real. If the therapist can com-
pletely conceal his own value 
orientation (or indifference) he 
could, of course, treat any patient. 
To do this, however, he would 
have to conduct the therapy from 
another room and in silence, and 
this, obviously, presents other 
problems. 
All of those who enter the world 
of moral counsell ing, the therapist, 
the social worker., the moralist, 
the clergyman, etc., are treading 
upon holy ground. They enter in a 
serious way into the sanctuary of 
human personhood. When we have 
done our best here, we remain 
unprofitable servants. T here is a 
consoling story of a good, old priest 
who had helped many with his 
counselling and preachi ng. When 
he was reminded of this upon his 
deathbed, he replied with smiling 
wisdom: " I thank God I have done 
so little harm!" Would that a ll of 
us who treat of the mora ls of men 
could merit such an epitaph. ®., 
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